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	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence	
	22 April 1975	
	INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM	
	The Situation in Vietnam (As of 1600 EDST) No. 21	•
	Reaction to Thieu's Resignation	
	1. There is near unanimous agreement among senior South Vietnamese civilian and military officials that President Thieu's decision to resign was a good one and that a new government should be formed immediately to attempt to arrange negotiations with the Communists. Nguyen Ba Can has told President Huong that he would resign and assist in any way possible to form a new cabinet. Beyond this, however, there are few specifics on what form the new government will take or who will serve in it.	
	2. General "Big" Minh, probably the leading candidate to head a new cabinet, is calling for a new government which would include staunch anti-Thieu members of the Catholic and Buddhist opposition groups. Former vice-president Ky wants to lead a new government, which would include General Vien, the chairman of the Joint General Staff, and former Prime Minister Khiem. "Big" Minh, in Ky's words, would play a "ceremonial role." There is also some maneuvering in the Senate to replace Tran Van Lam with Buddhist leader Vu Van Mau to allow Mau to become president when Huong resigns.	
	3. Communist reaction to Thieu's resignation continues to provide no encouragement for the prospects of meaning-ful negotiations. The Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary	25X1
NSA review(s) completed.		

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	Government dismissed Thieu's departure as a "clumsy and deceptive trick." Hanoi's Radio and party daily, Nhan Dan, focused on the continuation of American support for the new government and stated that the US in effect had replaced one loser with another. The North Vietnamese commentaries also gave considerable attention to the withdrawal of Americans from South Vietnam. They stated that all Americans could be evacuated "in a very short time, even in one day, without any difficulty or obstacle." They went on to strongly condemn US expressions of concern about Communist reprisals and warned against any US effort to evacuate large numbers of South Vietnamese. US naval vessels moving toward South Vietnamese waters, it was stated, are far more than would be needed simply to evacuate Americans.
	4. In short, the Communists are continuing to demand a totally new South Vietnamese government and a quick and total US withdrawal as the price for a negotiated surrender At least in their public commentary, there is no hint of give in their position, but there is the clear implication that time is quickly running out.

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Military Action

5. Communist shellings and ground attacks have fallen off sharply as both sides appear to be getting ready for future combat. The only significant military action was the reopening of Route 22 south of Tay Ninh City on April 22. Initial reporting indicates that elements of the North Vietnamese 316th Division were involved in the fighting. The South Vietnamese 25th Division headquarters reported the Communists sustained heavy casualties and that the North Vietnamese soldiers were very young and obviously inexperienced in combat.

South Vietnamese Estimate Gloomy

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lull in military activity is only to permit the Communists time to prepare their forces and coordinate plans to launch a combined attack on Bien Hoa and Saigon. The estimate of the ability of the government forces to resist the anticipated final thrust towards the capital city is bleak. Senior officials believe that if the attack is well coordinated, the government's defenses could crumble in a matter of hours. The estimate considers Saigon's remaining forces as battle weary, understrength, and unlikely to make a determined stand. South Vietnamese pilots are reportedly ready to fly out of the country and the military planners are not counting heavily on their support in a final battle. It is also expected that most of the territorial forces, National Police, and some regular soldiers will desert to look after their families.	
7. Many senior South Vietnamese officials are beginning to seek a way to escape from the country. This effort has become the major concern of key staff officers at Military Region 3 headquarters and as a result much of the necessary coordination and staff work is not being done.	
Tan Son Nhut Airbase to be Attacked 8. A Communist force comprised of artillery, armor, sappers, and infantry is planning to conduct a coordinated attack on Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airbase.	X1
north, west, and southwest. Infantry and tank units are to hold the base until reinforcements can arrive.	
9. The attacking forces probably will come from the Communist 9th Division which has moved into position for an assault on Saigon from the west. The newly created	1
232nd Corps headquarters, which controls the four Communist divisions arrayed against Saigon's western and southwestern approaches, will orchestrate the drive. 25X	1
10. The Communists may now have air defense units close to Tan Son Nhut cates the North Vietnamese have moved an antiaircraft fire	
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ontrol radar to a position eight miles northwest of the irbase, and a transport aircraft which had taken off rom the base the same day was fired on but was not damged. ien Hoa in Communist Artillery Umbrella 11. The Bien Hoa airbase and nearby munitions depot to Long Binh are being shelled almost daily by North Vietamese long range artillery. A shelling on April 22 exportedly caused a number of explosions in one of the unitions storage areas near Bien Hoa. 12	:
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orth Vietnamese gun crews have targeted specific areas	
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overnment Realigns Bien Hoa - Long Binh Defenses	
13. The South Vietnamese have now decided to transer only one of the two Marine brigades at Bien Hoa back Vung Tau. The other brigade will continue to man efensive positions in the Long Binh area. The Marines affer from poor morale and a lack of discipline, and bey probably will not fight hard if attacked.	
14. The 18th Division and the Airborne's 1st Brigade to now moving into the Bien Hoa - Long Binh area to rengthen government defenses. Both units withdrew in orderly fashion from Xuan Loc, and they appear to be apable of further combat. The division, however, has ally two regiments. A third was virtually destroyed	
the Xuan Loc fighting.	25×
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	soon reopen additional airfields in central South Vietnam.	
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